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ABSTRACT ————————————————————————————————————
I document that cross-country productivity differences in retail trade, which employs around
20% of workers, are accounted for in large part by compositional differences. In richer coun-
tries, most retailing is done in modern stores, with high measured output per worker, whereas
in developing countries, retail trade is dominated by less-productive traditional stores. I hy-
pothesize that developing countries rationally adopt few modern stores since car ownership
rates are low. A simple quantitative model of home production supports the role of cars in de-
termining the composition of retail technologies used and retail-sector productivity differences
across countries.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
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Why are observed differences in per capita income across countries so large? Development
accounting studies have concluded that cross-country differences in physical or human capital
per worker can explain only a minor part of the observed income gaps. Instead, variations in
productivity account for most of the income differences. Unfortunately, aggregate productivity
is still poorly understood (Klenow and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare, 1997; Prescott, 1998; Hall and Jones,
1999). In this paper, I shed light on aggregate differences in output per worker by explaining
productivity differences in one important sector, namely, retail trade.
My study of productivity differences in retail trade contributes to understanding aggregate dif-
ferences for two main reasons. First, the retail sector forms a large fraction of the aggregate,
employing just under 20% of all workers in a typical country.1 Thus, understanding measured
output per worker in retail trade is relevant for overall productivity. Second, my results lead
to new implications for why aggregate productivity differences might arise and what types of
government policies keep productivity low. Speciﬁcally, I argue that low measured productiv-
ity in developing-country retail largely represents the optimal choice of technology adoption
given the low income level of these countries. This is in stark contrast to arguments that low
measured productivity is the result of barriers to the adoption of new technologies (Parente
and Prescott, 1994), a lack of competitive pressure (Schmitz, 2005), or policies that misallocate
resources across producers (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008).2
My analysisconsists oftwo basicparts. Inthe ﬁrst part, Iuse disaggregate datafrom censusesof
retail tradetomeasureandaccountforproductivity differences intheretail sectors of theUnited
States and a set of developing countries. I show that retail-sector productivity differences are
largely accounted for by compositional differences, or speciﬁcally, differences in the relative
use of “modern” retail technologies, such as superstores, and “traditional” technologies, such
as “mom and pop” shops. Modern stores are used widely in the United States, and much less
frequently in the developing world. This is true even though, in the developing countries,
measured productivity in modern stores is roughly four times higher than in traditional stores.
In the second part of my analysis, I provide a theory of these retail compositional differences. I
argue that developing countries rationally adopt few modern stores since car ownership rates
are low. I support this idea using new geographic evidence from the United States and Mexico
showing that geographic districts with higher rates of car ownership have higher fractions of
retail employment at modern stores.
1In the United States, for example, the share of private employment in retail trade has ﬂuctuated in the range
of 16% to 19% since 1975 (Bosworth and Triplett, 2004).
2Other prominent ideas in this vein include worker resistance to new production methods (Clark, 1987) and
barriers to entry (Parente and Prescott, 1999; Herrendorf and Teixeira, 2009).
1I formalize this idea in a simple general-equilibrium model of home production in the spirit
of Becker (1965) and Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005). My theory assumes that
two retail technologies are freely available in all countries: highly productive modern stores
and less productive traditional stores. Both stores require an input of shopping time from
the households, and modern stores require a relatively larger time input. This assumption
is meant to capture the fact that traditional stores are typically located in residential neigh-
borhoods, whereas modern stores, which need more land, are usually located farther from
their customers. Households trade off the lower prices at modern stores against higher shop-
ping costs. Countries are endowed with exogenous differences in general productive efﬁciency,
which lead to differences in average household income. Most households in developed coun-
tries, with higher income, choose to buy cars and shop at modern stores; constrained by low
income, few households in developing countries buy cars, and most elect to shop at traditional
stores. Entrepreneurs thus rationally choose to operate the retail technology that ﬁts their cus-
tomers: more modern stores in richer countries and more traditional stores in poorer countries.3
I parameterize the model to resemble the United States, in particular in its high modern retail
shares and high car ownership rates. I then compute the model’s prediction when income is
lowered to Mexico’s level, in order to estimate how much of the differences in retail composi-
tion can be accounted for by the theory. I ﬁnd that the model explains roughly two-thirds of
the differences in retail composition between the United States and Mexico, and roughly one-
third of retail productivity differences. I conclude that the mechanism I have identiﬁed is an
important factor in understanding differences in the structure and measured productivity of
retail trade across countries.
I conclude by asking which policies affect retail productivity indeveloping countries. I examine
some existing policies that distort car markets, and provide evidence from a natural experiment
in Cyprus that relaxing restrictions on car imports increased car ownership and raised modern
store prevalence. Qualitatively, consistent with the case of Cyprus, the model predicts that
policies which lower car prices in developing countries would increase the number of modern
stores located there and increase sector productivity. Quantitatively, I ﬁnd the effects to be
sizeable.
The paper suggests new implications for how economists think about measured productiv-
ity differences across countries. One implication is that developing countries may rationally
choose some technologies with low measured productivity given that overall efﬁciency (and
hence average income) is low. In this vein, my work is similar to that of Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001) and Caselli and Coleman (2006), who argue that developing countries may optimally
3I abstract from spatial competition for simplicity, and because it allows for more transparency in the quantita-
tive analysis. For a model of spatial competition between retail stores with the same qualitative predictions as the
current paper, see Lagakos (2008).
2choose different technologies than richer countries. These studies differ in that they argue that
poor countries may adopt different technologies because of low endowments of skilled labor,
not low average income, like in my study. My work also shares some of the ﬂavor of Jones
(2009), who argues that low productivity in one sector, such as manufacturing, could be the
result of inefﬁciencies in a complementary sector, such as electricity.
A second implication of my paper is that a broader fraction of household time and capital
goods are inputs to production than previously thought, and hence some household inputs are
missing from current productivity measures. In the retail trade sector, this applies to household
shopping time and capital goods used for transportation and storage, such as cars. The (large)
non-tradeable service sector is also likely to be affected, since households spend time and goods
inputs acquiring market services. In this way, my work builds on the tradition of papers in
macroeconomics that assign home production a central role in driving aggregate phenomena
(for example, Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright, 1991; Parente, Rogerson, and Wright, 2000). The
work most closely related to mine is that of Buera and Kaboski (2007), who look at the role of
home production in the rise of the service economy. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is
the ﬁrst to link home production to differences in technology adoption across countries.
2 Retail Productivity Differences across Countries
In this section, I document that differences in the composition of retail technologies used across
countries are an important factor in accounting for measured productivity gaps in retailing. My
paper is the ﬁrst to use national census data to study differences in retail productivity levels
between the United States and the developing world. The McKinsey Productivity Studies,
discussed in detail below, provide an earlier and less formal study of these differences using
their own (private) data.
2.1 Retail Output and Labor Productivity
I begin by describing how I measure retail productivity. The main component in measuring
productivity in any economic activity is the measure of output. Conceptually, the output of
a retailer is perhaps best described as “a composite bundle of services” attached to the goods
being sold (Oi, 1992). This composite service is not directly measurable, however. Hence, retail
output is constructed by deﬂating some measure of the value of retail output by an appropriate
price measure.
To compute output in this way, I assume that ﬁnal retail output Y is a combination of two
inputs: a composite service produced by the retailer and an intermediate good purchased by
3the retailer for resale, denoted X. Formally, the production function is
Y =m i n [ A · N,X], (1)
where Ais the efﬁciency of service production and N isthe labor inputhired bythe retailer. One
might think of X as a basket at goods at the factory door and Y as that same basket available for
purchase on the retail store shelves. I assume no substitutability between the retail services and
the intermediate good purchased for resale, since it permits productivity measures using the
publicly available censuses at my disposal and since the assumption seems to be fairly standard
in retail productivity measurement; the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) makes this
assumption when measuring retail-sector value added, for example.4
2.2 Using New Censuses of Retail Trade
To measure retail productivity, I use new data from censuses of retail trade that I collected for
a set of developing countries. The set includes every developing country in which a census
of retail establishments has been conducted in the last 10 years, and for which international
comparisons could be made.5 In Appendix A I provide more detail about the censuses. I end
up with data from Brazil (2002), El Salvador (2004), Mexico (2003), the Philippines (2005), and
Thailand (2002). For comparisons, I also draw on data from the United States for the same years
as the foreign censuses, using retail-sector data from the BEA.
The censuses provide comparable measures of labor input, the value of sales, and the cost of
goods purchased for resale, by size category of retail establishment. To facilitate international
comparisons, I express all nominal quantities in international dollars, which are adjusted for
purchasing power parity (PPP) using the consumption price deﬂator from the Penn World Ta-
bles. The motivation for this choice of deﬂator is that the price of the goods sold at retail should
be reasonably proxied by the price of consumption goods paid by households.
Imeasurelaborproductivity ineachcountry forthree segmentsofretailestablishments, namely,
the modern stores (M), the traditional stores (T), and the retail sector as a whole (R). I deﬁne
modern establishments to be those with 20 ormore workers. This deﬁnition allows a reasonable
proxy for stores using advanced inventory and distribution techniques, and maximal compati-
bility across countries. Traditional stores are therefore those with fewer than 20 workers.6
4Furthermore, the North American Industrial Classiﬁcation System (NAICS), used to construct my U.S. data,
deﬁnes the retail trade sector as “establishments engaged in retailing merchandise, generally without transforma-
tion,” implying a separation between producing the goods themselves and the services added to sell them.
5I thank Karin Murphy and Brooke Tosi of the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank Research Library for their
invaluable help with this search.
6Size cutoffs of 10+ or 50+ workers produce similar results as the ones I present below in the countries that
permit these cutoffs. Results for these measures are available on request.
4For country i and segment j ∈{ M,T,R}, I express labor productivity relative to the U. S. retail
sector asa whole (since disaggregate U. S. data are not available). Let Yi,j and Ni,j be output and
labor input in country i and segment j,a n dl e tYUS,Rand NUS,Rbe output and labor input in the
U.S. retail sector as a whole. Using the production function in (1), relative labor productivity













where pi,jYi,j andpxYi,j are salesandthe cost ofgoods purchased for resalein country i,s e g m e n t
j. This ratio represents the real quantity of services produced per worker in country i,s e c t o rj,
relative to the U. S. retail sector.
2.3 Retail Productivity Low in Developing Countries...
Figure 1 shows the computations for labor productivity for the retail sector as a whole in each
country. The U. S. retail sector is normalized to 100. The ﬁgure shows that the set of devel-
oping countries all have productivity on the order of one-third of the U. S. level. Brazil and
Thailand are the highest, with 36% and 35% of the U. S. level, and El Salvador, Mexico, and the























Figure 1: Retail-Sector Productivity in the United States and Developing Countries
5The results suggest that the retail-sector productivity gaps largely mimic those of the aggregate,
with large productivity differences separating the United States from the developing world.
According to the Penn World Tables, in the same years as the retail census discussed here, per
capita incomes in PPP dollars compared to the United States were: Brazil (20%), El Salvador
(13%), Mexico (23%), the Philippines (11%), and Thailand (20%). At least among this set of de-
veloping countries, countries with lower per capita GDP tend to have lower output per worker
in retail trade. But most importantly, retail productivity is much lower in these developing
c o u n t r i e st h a ni nt h eU n i t e dS t a t e s .
2 . 4 . . .A n dH i g h e ri nM o d e r nS t o r e s, Even in Developing Countries


































Figure 2: Labor Productivity in Modern and Traditional Stores
Figure 2 shows labor productivity by retail segment, with the U. S. retail sector as a whole again
normalized to 100. The most dramatic feature to note is that productivity in modern stores is
much higher than in traditional stores. Modern stores range from 68% to 83% of the U. S. level,
whereas traditional stores range from 12% to 23%. On average, labor is 4.3 times more produc-
tive in modern stores than in traditional stores, with Brazil, Mexico, and Thailand around 3.7
times, El Salvador at 4.4 times, and the Philippines highest at 6.0 times more productive.
6The second noteworthy feature is that modern productivity in these countries appears fairly
high relative to the United States, at an average of 75% of the U. S. level. This feature is perhaps
surprising given the much larger gaps in the retail sector as a whole. One possible explanation
for this phenomenon is that many modern stores in the developing world are in fact operated
by European or U.S. chains. For example, the French retailer Carrefour has extensive opera-
tions in Brazil, and Wal-Mart is the leading retailer in Mexico. Since the census data do not
allow separation by domestic ownership status, it remains an open question whether the high
productivity of modern stores is driven by foreign participants. A separate but related question
is how modern and traditional stores in the United States compare to their counterparts in the
developing countries. Publicly available data for the United States preclude these calculations
as well. According to the McKinsey Productivity Studies (described in Appendix A), produc-
tivity in modern stores is on average 70% as high in the developing countries as modern stores
in the United States, and for traditional stores, productivity is on average 55% of that in the
United States.
One key question is whether these labor productivity differences can be accounted for by dif-
ferences in capital or land per worker. Although limited data on capital preclude calculations
for the entire set of developing countries, in Appendix A I use data from Mexico to construct
Total-Factor Productivity (TFP) measures by retail segment. I conclude that labor productivity
differences between Mexico and the United States largely represent TFP differences.
2.5 Few Modern Stores in Developing Countries
Having computed productivity differences by type of store, I now turn to the question of how
frequently each type is used. Figure 3 shows the percentage of retail trade employment in each
type of store, with the two bars for each country summing to 100%. The large compositional
differences are immediately apparent. In the United States, 67% of retail employment is in
modern establishments and just 33%is in traditional stores.7 Ineachof the developing counties,
in contrast, modern stores employ around 20% of all retail workers. It is also perhaps surprising
how uniform the modern shares are, with a low of 15% in El Salvador and the Philippines and
highs of just 21% and 23% in Brazil and Mexico.
The ﬁgure suggests a prominent role for differences in modern employment shares in ex-
plaining retail-sector output-per-worker differences, especially given that labor productivity
is around four times higher in modern stores, as shown in the previous section.
7Modern stores seem to dominate retailing in Western Europe as well. According to Baily and Solow (2001, p.
165, Table 5), modern retailers constitute 70 - 75% of total retail sales in Germany, France, the United Kingdom,


































Figure 3: Employment Shares in Modern and Traditional Stores
2.6 Composition Important for Retail Productivity Differences
The results thus far suggest that differences in the composition of retail technologies used are
central in accounting for measured productivity differences in the retail sector as a whole. I
conclude thissection byformally quantifying therole of composition. For each country studied,
I ask how much higher output per worker would be under the United States retail composition,
holding ﬁxed the productivity levels of the two technologies.
The ﬁrst data column of Table 1 shows the actual productivity levels for the sector as a whole
(as in Figure 2), with labor from 21% to 36% as productive as the United States. The second col-
umn shows what labor productivity would be hypothetically in each country under the United
States’s composition, namely, 67% of employment in modern stores. For each country, the hy-
pothetical productivity level would be above one-half the U. S. level, in the range of 52% to
64%. The third column reports the ratio of hypothetical to actual productivity. The ratios range
from 1.5 to 2.5 with an average of 1.95, implying that productivity would roughly double in
these countries if they were to use the United States mix of technologies. The fourth column
reports the percentage of the gap between the country and the United States that is closed un-
der this experiment. The ﬁndings show a closing in the range of 31% to 44% of the productivity
differential. The analysis implies more formally what the graphs earlier suggest, namely, that
labor productivity differences in retail trade are accounted for in large part by composition
differences.
8COUNTRY RETAIL SECTOR Y/N RATIO OF % OF GAP
HYPOTHETICAL WITH UNITED STATES
ACTUAL UNDER UNITED STATES TO ACTUAL CLOSED
MODERN SHARE Y/L
Brazil 36 55 1.52 31
El Salvador 28 60 2.14 44
Mexico 30 52 1.73 32
Philippines 21 52 2.50 40
Thailand 35 64 1.82 44
Note: Labor productivity in the United States retail sector is normalized to 100.
Table 1: Retail Composition and Productivity Differences
These composition differences seem to have played a central role in explaining retail produc-
tivity gains in recent U. S. history as well. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2006) show that
virtually all the labor productivity gains in retail trade over the 1990s are accounted for by
more productive retail establishments replacing less productive ones. Furthermore, the stores
being replaced were mostly small, independent establishments, and most of the expansion was
in large-scale modern stores.
3 An Explanation for the Differences
The ﬁndings thus far suggest that differences in the adoption of modern stores are a key factor
in accounting for retail productivity differences across countries. Poorer countries could double
their measured output per worker in retail trade by using the United States composition rather
than their own. So why don’t they? In this section, I present one theory for these composition
differences. For expositional purposes, I relegate the discussion of other candidate explanations
to Appendix B.
In short, my theory is as follows. Because of their large scale of operation, modern stores must
locate farther than traditional stores from residential centers in order to operate. Cars and other
durable goods, such asrefrigerators and spacious houses, allow households to reduce shopping
time at modern stores bycutting down on travel time pertrip as well asthe numberof shopping
trips. Households without these complementary durable goods ﬁnd themselves with high time
9costs of doing their shopping at modern stores. Since households in poor countries elect to buy
fewer of these durable goods (because of their low income), fewer modern stores operate.
I focus on cars in this paper for simplicity and because there is evidence that, unlike cars, re-
frigerators are fairly common in many developing counties. According to 2000 Census data
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International (IPUMS-I), household refrigera-
tor ownership rates were 70% in Mexico and 83% in Brazil, compared to car ownership rates of
just 32% and 34%.8
The important role of cars in limiting large-scale stores has received ample attention in the
literature on retailing in developing countries. Bromley (1998)typiﬁes the view of this literature
when, in her study of Latin American retailing, she argues that
the pattern of retail space in the Latin American city reﬂects some powerful inﬂu-
ences of consumer behavior. Low mobility constrains most consumers to patronis-
ing traditional retail facilities which can be reached by foot or bus, whilst the small,
afﬂuent car-owning sector of the population comprises the principal clientele of the
modern supermarket and planned shopping centres.9
3.1 Modern Stores Located Mostly in Areas with Cars
In this section, I provide some new geographic evidence that further supports the role of cars
in limiting the widespread adoption of modern stores. I focus on Mexico and the United States,
since economic and household census data are collected for these countries at a low (and com-
parable) level of geographic disaggregation.10 The modern retail share in the United States is
the fraction of retail employees at establishments with 20 or more employees. In Mexico, the
modern share is the fraction of food retail employees at supermarkets, which is the best proxy
available by county (municipio).
To support my theory that low car ownership explains some of the developing countries’ re-
liance on traditional stores, the data should show a positive relationship among car ownership
8Historical studies on the rise of modern retailing in the United States have also emphasized the role of cars
and household durables more broadly (Fuchs, 1969; Oi, 1992). In recent paper, Kopecky and Suen (2008) explore
the role of cars in the suburbanization of the United States.
9Similarly, in his study of retailing in China, Goldman (2000) argues that although “appropriate sites [for mod-
ern stores] are more easily available in the outlying areas, these areas are sparsely populated and large-scale stores
there will need to draw customers from larger distances. However, since the ownership of motorized vehicles
(cars or motorcycles) is very limited, this is not feasible at present.”
10For the United States, I use the 2000Census of Population and 2004County Business Patterns datato construct
county-level measures of median household income, average household car ownership, and the fraction of retail
employment in modern stores. For Mexico, I use the 2000 Mexican Census of Population and the 2004 Censo
Econ´ omico,c o n s t r u c t e db yt h eInstituto Nacional de Estadist´ ıca, Geograf´ ıa e Inform´ atica (INEGI). All data are
publicly available at www.inegi.gob.mx/inegi/default.aspx. I obtain the census data from I-IPUMS. Income in
both countries is measured as the median household income expressed in 2000 PPP dollars.
10COUNTRY VARIABLE PERCENTILE OF COUNTY INCOME DISTRIBUTION
0 − 25 25 − 50 50 − 75 75 − 100
Median Household Income $4,062 $8,075 $11,606 $19,024
Mexico Car Ownership Rate 0.15 0.27 0.36 0.49
Modern Retail Share 0.02 0.09 0.24 0.37
Median Household Income $32,343 $39,852 $45,059 $59,054
United States Car Ownership Rate 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.94
Modern Retail Share 0.58 0.66 0.69 0.71
Table 2: Modern Retail Shares within the United States and Mexico
and share of retail workers at modern stores. That is indeed what they show. Table 2 sum-
marizes the values of these variables by percentile of the county income distribution. As can
be seen in Mexico, counties with the highest average income have car ownership rates and
modern retail shares substantially higher than counties with lower income. The richest quartile
of counties has a 49% car ownership rate and a modern share of 37%. The poorest quartile,
in contrast, has a car ownership rate of 15% and a modern share of just 2%. These ﬁndings
provide evidence that areas in a developing country with high modern store shares are also
areas with high car ownership, and vice versa. The pattern appears prominently in the United
States as well, with a lot less variation across county groups in car ownership and modern store
presence.11
The United States’ data are useful in supporting the cars theory in two ways. First, they conﬁrm
that modern stores are widespread across the county income distribution, just like cars. Second,
and more interestingly, they help provide some evidence that variation in modern retail shares
is related to auto ownership itself, as opposed to some other factor related to income. In the
United States, substantial variation can be found in median household income across counties,
with a factor of 1.8 separating the lowest quartile from the highest. Car ownership exhibits
much less variation, with a range of just 0.86 to 0.94. The fact that modern retail shares also
exhibit little variation within the United States — like cars and unlike income — swings the
pendulum toward cars, rather than some other factor working through income.
11I also have found evidence that this pattern holds in Peru. Details are available upon request.
114 Model of Retail Technology Adoption
I now formalize the idea outlined above that household car ownership prevalence determines
the composition of retail technologies used, and hence measured retail productivity.
4.1 Household Preferences and Technology
The economy is populated by a unit measure of households that have preferences over con-
sumption goods (c), automobiles (a), and leisure time. Households are endowed with one unit
of time, spend ¯ n units of time working (inelastically, for simplicity), and spend ns units of time
shopping for consumption goods (which they choose). Households vary in two dimensions:
the value of their leisure time, and their human capital level, which affects the efﬁciency of one
unit of their labor. Preferences of household i are given by
Ui =l o g ( c)+ψi log(1 − ¯ n − ns)+α · a, (3)
where ψi is household i’s value on leisure, α is the utility of having a car, and a ∈{ 0,1} captures
car ownership, with a =1if and only if the household owns a car. One can think of α as
capturing the direct ﬂow of utility from “Sunday drives” or commuting services, distinct from
its value asa shopping device. The ψi are drawn from some distribution H(·)with non-negative
support, and represent taste differences in leisure activities versus consumption goods.
As in Becker (1965), I assume the ﬁnal consumption good is “produced” by the household by
combining market goods (y), household shopping time (ns), and possibly an auto (a). One
can think of y as a basket of the composite consumption good on the store shelves and c as
that same basket in the kitchen cupboard. To turn y into c, the household must spend time
shopping, possibly using the car.12 The household may elect to shop at either modern (M) or
traditional (T) retail segments (explained further below). Formally, let j ∈{ M,T} denote the
segment type, and let the home production function for ﬁnal consumption goods from a type-j
retailer be denoted Cj(yj,n s,j,a). Total consumption is given by
c = CM(yM,n s,M,a)+CT(yT,n s,T,a). (4)
There is a ﬁxed shopping time cost for the household that varies by retail segment, denoted νj.
Shopping at the modern segment requires a relatively larger time cost, that is, νM >ν T. This
assumption is a crude but tractable way of capturing the friction associated with modern retail
stores, namely, that their larger scale of operations forces them to locate farther from the typical
12This speciﬁcation is akin to the home production models of Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005), and
Buera and Kaboski (2007) in that durable goods facilitate household consumption.
12household and hence requires a larger input of a household’s travel time in order for market
transactions to occur.13 Formally, the shopping production function is given by
Cj(yj,n s,j,a) ≡
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
yj if ns,j ≥ γ · νj and a =1
yj if ns,j ≥ νj and a =0
0 otherwise,
(5)
where the parameter γ ≤ 1 represents the time savings by shopping with a car. This production
function says simply that in order for the household to consume, it must pay for the consump-
tion goods and spend time shopping and transporting the goods home. The car cuts down
on the required shopping time at either retail segment. This can be thought of as arising from
faster travel time per trip as well as economizing on the number of shopping trips.
Finally, the budget constraint for household i is given by
ηi¯ nw ≥ paa + pTyT + pMyM, (6)
where ηi is the human capital of household i and w is the wage per unit of human capital. The ηi
termsare drawnfrom some distribution G(·)with non-negative support andare independentof
H(·), the distribution of household leisure values. Heterogeneity in human capital will lead to
a distribution of wages in the economy and hence heterogeneity in the car ownership decision.
4.2 Market Production
Market production is done in two distinct sectors: the intermediate goods sector and the re-
tail sector. Production technologies in both sectors are operated by perfectly competitive en-
trepreneurs, and there is unrestricted access to any production technology. The intermediate
goods sector produces a composite good X using a constant-returns technology
X = E · N, (7)
where E denotes general efﬁciency of production in the economy, and is meant to be thought
of as the primitive of a given country. Intermediates may either be turned into retail goods by
being combined with retail services (described below) or be turned into cars. A car may be
produced from ¯ A units of intermediates.
13For a spatial model that captures this friction more explicitly see Lagakos (2008). Abstracting from space
maintains the qualitative predictions of that model while allowing more transparency in the quantitative analysis
that follows in the subsequent section.
13The retail sector produces retail services and then combines these services with the intermedi-
ate goods to produce a ﬁnal output Y that households may purchase. Two different retailing
technologies are available: modern and traditional, each of which uses labor to produce re-
tail services. The two technologies are best thought of as representing the output of a retail
segment, or aggregate of stores in each technology type, rather than the output of a particular
store. Letting j ∈{ M,T} index the technology type, the production function is given by
Yj =m i n [ E · Zj · Nj,X], (8)
where E · Zj is the efﬁciency of labor in producing retail services. This comprises general
efﬁciency, E, timesretail-technology-speciﬁc efﬁciency, Zj. Of the two technologies, the modern
one is more efﬁcient at providing retail services; that is, ZM >Z T.
4.3 Stages of Production
Summarizing the stages of production of the ﬁnal consumption good described above is help-











Figure 4: Stages of Production
The intermediate goods sector uses labor to produce X, a good at the factory door. Next, the
retail sector combines X with labor to produce Y , a good on the store shelf. Finally, a household
combines shopping time (possibly with a car) and store-bought goods Y to produce c, a good
in the kitchen cupboard, which the household can consume.
4.4 Optimization and Market Clearing
Household optimization consists of two discrete choices: where to shop and whether to buy a
car. Intuitively, since cars are superior goods in the utility function, buying one is optimal only
when income is sufﬁciently high. As for the choice of where to shop, because goods are perfect
substitutes as ﬁnal consumption, households will go to a corner and do all their purchases at
14one of the two retail segments. The key trade-off that households face is one of time savings
versus cost savings. Shopping at the modern store takes more time but offers lower prices.
Optimal household behavior is most easily understood in a world without heterogeneity in
human capital or time value. In such a world, all households choose to buy a car if and only
if E is sufﬁciently high. Regarding the choice of where to shop, one of three cases is possible
(depending on parameters). First, households shop at the traditional segment regardless of
whether they have a car. Second, households shop at the modern segment whether or not they
have a car. Third, and most interestingly, they shop at the modern segment if and only if they
have a car. In this third case, one can see the model’s main result cleanly. When E is sufﬁciently
high, all households buy cars and shop at modern stores. Otherwise, when E is low, no one
owns a car and no households shop at modern stores. The choice of which retail technology is
used is driven entirely by optimal household behavior given E.
Although transparent, the homogeneous world is not suitable for quantitative analysis, since
household optimization implies that the economy uses either all modern stores or none. To get
predictions for the (empirically relevant) case of modern store shares between 0 and 1, we must
return to the model with heterogeneity. In this case, optimal behavior is as follows.
Proposition 1 For a household with human capital ηi and time value ψi, purchasing a car is optimal if
and only if
ηi ≥ ˜ η(ψ) ≡
pA
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Shopping in the modern segment is optimal if and only if











given car ownership status a ∈{ 0,1}.
Figure 5 illustrates the household’s optimal behavior characterized in Proposition 1.E a c h
household is represented as an element of the plane, with the x-axis representing ψi and the
y-axis representing ηi. It helps to divide the households into three groups based on their time
value ψi.T h e modern-only households are those with relatively low values of ψi, satisfying











Figure 5: Solution to the Households’ Problem
ψi < ˜ ψ(0), and shop at modern stores whether or not they have a car. The ﬂexible households,
for lack of a better term, have ψi satisfying ˜ ψ(0) ≤ ψi < ˜ ψ(1), and shop at modern stores if and
only if they purchase a car. Finally, the traditional-only households have relatively high values
of ψi, satisfying ψi ≥ ˜ ψ(1). The shaded portion of the ﬁgure describes the set of households that
shop at modern stores, with the darker region representing those that come by car.14
One important feature of the model is that a household’s human capital level does not affect its
choice of where to shop (over and above the car purchase decision). In other words, the cutoffs
˜ ψ(a) do not depend on ηi. Households with higher human capital have a higher opportunity
cost of shopping time in terms of wage income, but this cost is exactly offset by the decreasing
marginal utility of additional goods purchased with those wages. The balanced growth pref-
erences which drive this feature of the model were assumed in order to match the observation
of roughly constant shopping time over the income distribution in the cross section of U. S.
households.15
Turning to the producers’ problems, it is simplest to let X be the numeraire. Since markets are
perfectly competitive, the wage must satisfy w = E, and retail pricesmust satisfy pM =1 + 1 /ZM
and pT =1+1 /ZT. Notice that prices are lower in modern stores than in traditional stores. The
auto price must be pa = ¯ A. Firm optimization is consistent with any quantity of labor hired;
14The non-linearity of the car purchase decision in ψ is reconciled as follows. For modern-only households
and traditional-only households, ˜ η(ψ) is decreasing in ψ because as ψ rises, households value more highly the
time savings from having a car. For ﬂexible households, as ψ rises, the time savings of the traditional store make
shopping at the modern store with a car a less attractive option. Hence, the value of a car decreases with ψ.
15According to my calculations from the 2003 American Time Use Survey (ATUS),the correlation of income and
shopping time is 0.02.
16the household side (along with the efﬁciency parameters E, ZM,a n dZT) determines the mix of
employment in the intermediate sector and two retail segments.
Finally, an equilibrium ofthe model occurs when all agents optimize, and the ﬁve markets clear.
These are the labor market, the market for intermediate goods, the car market, and the modern
and traditional retail markets. For brevity, the equations behind these conditions are omitted.
4.5 Retail-Sector Composition and Productivity
I now turn to how productivity in retail is measured and determined in equilibrium. Let YR ≡
YM+YT be total retail output andNR ≡ NM+NT represent total retail employment. The modern









= μ · E · ZM +( 1− μ) · E · ZT (12)
using (8). This expression allows one to see clearly how composition affects overall productiv-
ity: since ZM >Z T by assumption, an economy with a higher modern retail share μ will have
ah i g h e rv a l u ef o rYR/NR. The main comparative static of the paper is that, with one restriction
on parameters (discussed below),
Proposition 2 The modern retail share, μ,i si n c r e a s i n gi nE and increasing in the mean of the human
capital distribution.
Proposition 2 says that an increase in E induces more households to buy cars since average
income is now higher and, as a result, a higher fraction of households shop in the modern
segment, thereby raising μ. A similar result holds when the human capital distribution shifts
up. The condition on parameters is, loosely speaking, that the auto price is not too high. In
Appendix C I demonstrate that if ¯ A is not sufﬁciently high relative to average income, then μ
is strictly increasing in E. Intuitively, the restriction assures that the increase in expenditure at
modern stores coming from ﬂexible households that switched from traditional to modern is not
outweighed by the value of cars now purchased by modern-only households, who each divert
pa out of their expenditure at modern stores.
175 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, Iassess the quantitative importance of carownership rates on retail composition.
I ﬁrst parameterize the model to match features of the U.S. economy in 2000, including its high
modern store share and high car ownership rate. I then ask how much lower the modern share
would be under Mexico’s income level. I ﬁnd that the model predicts roughly two-thirds the
modern share differences between the United States and Mexico, and makes predictions for
Mexican car ownership and other variables that are in line with Mexican data.
5.1 Parameterization of Model Economy
I ﬁrst present an overview of how the model is parameterized to the 2000 U. S. economy. Ap-
pendix C provides a more detailed description of how each parameter value is selected.
I begin by picking a functional form for the distributions of human capital and time value, G(η)
and H(ψ). I set both to be lognormal, with ﬁrst and second moments φη and ση for G(·) and φψ
and σψ for H(·). Thatmakes13parametersfor which valuesmustbe chosen, includingthe 4just
described. The other 9 are the work time and shopping variables (¯ n, νM,a n dνT); the car cost,
value, and time savings parameters ( ¯ A, α,a n dγ); and the market technology parameters (E,
ZM,a n dZT). Table 3 below summarizes the parameter value choices and their interpretations.
Brieﬂy, the parameter values are selected as follows. I normalize E =1and choose φη and
ση to match the mean and variance of the 2000 U. S. income distribution, which are $63,950
and $70,712. Roughly speaking, φψ controls the share of employment at modern stores, which I
match to be 0.67 as per the ﬁndings of Section 2,a n dσψ controls the conditional probability that
a shopper at a modern store came via car, which I match to 0.97 as found by the retail literature.
Is e t¯ n to be 1/3 to represent eight hours of market work per day, and set ¯ A to match a $5,500
yearly cost of operating a car (according to the American Automobile Association). I choose α
to give a 91% car ownership rate, which is consistent with data from the 2000 U. S. census. For γ
I choose a value of 0.66, which is consistent with evidence on the time savings from commuting
by car versus commuting by public transportation. I pick νM and νT to be consistent with aver-
age shopping times for households with and without cars, using data from the ATUS. Finally,
Is e tZT and ZM to make modern stores three times as productive as traditional stores, broadly
consistent with the ﬁndings of Section 2, and to make the share of aggregate employment in
retail trade equal to 14%, as in the United States in 2000.
18PARAMETER VALUE INTERPRETATION
1 E 1.00 General efﬁciency of production
2 φη 0.25 Mean of log human capital distribution
3 ση 0.89 Standard deviation of log human capital distribution
4 φψ 1.86 Mean of log time value distribution
5 σψ 0.29 Standard deviation of log time value distribution
6 ¯ n 0.33 Time spent working
7 α 0.51 Taste parameter for cars
8 ¯ A 0.06 Cost of a car
9 γ 0.66 Shopping time savings from car ownership
10 νM 0.04 Shopping time at modern segment without a car
11 νT 0.01 Shopping time at traditional segment without a car
12 ZT 2.62 Efﬁciency of production at traditional retail segment
13 ZM 7.86 Efﬁciency of production at modern retail segment
Table 3: Parameter Values
5.2 Experiment: Model’s Predictions for Mexico
I now simulate the model’s predictions when income is set to resemble the Mexican income
distribution. Speciﬁcally, I ﬁrst lower φη to match the human capital level of Mexico relative to
the United States, which is 54% according to Hall and Jones (1999). Second, I lower ση to match
the standard deviation of the Mexican income distribution, which is $40,731. Third, I lower E
so that the average wage corresponds to that of Mexico in 2000, which is $15,987. This requires
lowering E to 0.43. I then re-solve the model leaving all other parameter choices the same.16
Table 4 presents the results of the experiment. The ﬁrst row contains the predicted and actual
modern retail employment shares (μ), which are the main object of interest in the experiment.
The modelpredicts a sizeable drop from 0.67inthe UnitedStates to 0.39inMexico, compared to
0.23 in the Mexican data. This represents 64% of the United States–Mexico gap in modern retail
employment shares, suggesting that the theory is quantitatively important in explaining retail
compositional differences. Still, the remaining gap between the model and the data is large,
suggesting an important role for other factors in limiting modern store diffusion in Mexico.
As shown in the second row, the model predicts that Mexico’s retail-sector output per worker
16An alternative experiment lowers E to match the average wage in Mexico, keeping the human capital dis-
tribution unchanged. Results for modern store shares are similar in this experiment, but overall Mexican retail
productivity is too low compared to the data, which is why I prefer the current experiment. Details are available
on request.
19VARIABLE UNITED STATES, 2000 MEXICO, 2000
MODEL DATA MODEL DATA
MODERN RETAIL SHARE ( μ ) 0.67 0.67 0.39 0.23
RETAIL-SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY ( YR/NR ) 1.00 1.00 0.32 0.30
AUTO OWNERSHIP RATE 0.91 0.91 0.37 0.32
RETAIL-SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.16
SHARE IN AGGREGATE
Table 4: Experiment: Model’s Predictions for Mexico
(YR/NR) is 32% of the U. S. level. This is quite close to the 30% value documented in the data (in
Section 2 of the paper). This prediction is the result of two forces: the exogenous lowering of
E to 43% of the U. S. value and the endogenous prediction that μ drops from 0.67 to 0.39. The
endogenous drop in modern store shares by itself leads to 24% lower retail-sector productivity,
or around one-third of the measured productivity gap between Mexico and the United States.
Theﬁnaltworows show twootherimportantpredictions of themodel: thepercentageof house-
holds owning cars and the share of aggregate employment in retail trade. The model produces
an elasticity of car ownership to income that is similar to its empirical counterpart in Mexico,
with the model predicting 37% car ownership compared to 32% in the data. For retail’s share
of aggregate employment, the model predicts an increase from 14% in the United States to 18%
in Mexico, whereas in the Mexican data, retail trade represents 16% of total employment. The
model gets the right sign, but predicts too large of an increase in the retail-sector size. I conjec-
ture that incorporating more realistic relative sector productivity changes would improve the
m o d e l ’ sﬁ ti nt h i sd i m e n s i o n .
5.3 Model’s Predictions for Shopping Time and Store Prices
I now assess the model’s predictions for average shopping time and relative prices at modern
and traditional stores. Assessing these two predictions is worthwhile since the model’s main
trad-eoff is one of lower prices versus higher shopping time at modern stores. I ﬁnd that the
model’s predictions are quantitatively in line with the available evidence.
The model predicts that shopping time should be 4% lower in Mexico than in the United States.
This is accounted for by fewer model households shopping at relatively time-intensive modern
20stores. Although the United States and Mexico have both conducted time surveys, the ques-
tions and methodology differ in the two countries, which makes comparisons difﬁcult. The two
internationally comparable time use surveys of which I am aware are the Multi National Time
Use Survey (MNTUS) and the Harmonised European Time Use Survey (HETUS). Allesandria
and Kaboski (2007) use these two surveys to study the link between average shopping time and
average income in the cross-section of countries. In both surveys they ﬁnd a positive relation-
ship between income per capita and average time spent shopping. According to their estimates,
a 77% drop in income (corresponding to the drop in my experiment) is associated with a drop
in average shopping time of 15%, with a 90% conﬁdence interval of between a 1% drop and a
28% drop.17 I conclude that the model’s shopping time predictions are quantitatively consistent
with the international correlation between average shopping time and per capita income level.
The model’s predictions for relative prices in the two segments are in the range suggested by
the data as well. In the model, the price at modern stores is 18% lower than the price at tradi-
tional stores. For the United States, Hausman and Leibtag (2005) analyze data on prices paid
by households for a set of 20 food items at two types of retailers: traditional supermarkets, and
a second category which consists of “supercenters, mass merchandisers, and club stores.” They
ﬁnd that prices in the latter “modern” category ranged from 5% to 48% lower than in the tra-
ditional category. Basker (2005) cites evidence that Wal-Mart prices are in the range of 17% to
39% lower than competing grocery stores. Internationally, the most direct evidence comes from
the McKinsey Global Institute. For a set of comparable goods in Mexico, McKinsey reports that
prices in traditional stores were between 5% and 15% higher than in modern stores. For Brazil,
they report up to 30% higher prices in traditional stores; in Poland prices are between 10% to
30% higher; in Thailand on average 21% higher; and in Turkey, up to 30% higher.
5.4 What Disciplines the Quantitative Results?
The results thus far have shown that the model produces quantitatively large effects of income
on modern retail shares. Whatdrives these quantitative predictions? Intuitively, the elasticity of
the modern retail share to income is driven by two components: the elasticity of car ownership
to income, and the difference in the probability of shopping at the modern store between car
owners and non-car owners. The discipline on the former comes from the model’s matching
the car ownership in the United States, where all but the poorest households own cars. I also
showed above that the model’s elasticity is in line with the empirical elasticity implied by the
United States and Mexican data.
The conditional probability of shopping at a modern store for car owners and non-car owners
17From the HETUS, they estimate a coefﬁcient of log shopping time on log GDP per capita of 0.198 with a
t-statistic of 2.83, and from the MTUS their estimate is 0.208 with a t-statistic of 3.10.
21is disciplined as follows. The parameterized model matches the unconditional probabilities
of shopping at a modern store and owning a car, and the conditional probability that a given
shopper at a modern store is a car owner. The conditional probabilities of shopping at a modern
store given car ownership (and not) follow by Bayes’ rule. Intuitively, the fact that the fraction
of modern-store shoppers that are car owners is higher than the fraction of all households that
are car owners tells us that households are more likely to shop at modern stores if they have a
car. The difference between these two fractions pins down how much more likely a car owner
is to shop at modern stores than a non-car owner.
The model’s conditional probabilities of shopping at a modern store are 86% for car owners
and 30% for non-car owners. Unfortunately, few direct estimates of these probabilities exist.
The one study I was able to ﬁnd (by Bromley and Thomas, 1993) uses survey evidence from
the town of Swansea in the United Kingdom to document that “between 71% and 86% of car
owners patronized a superstore for their food shopping; for the carless the percentages vary
between 31% and 57%.” These estimates are very much in line with the model’s values.
6 Policies that Distort the Market for Cars
Thus far, I have argued that retail technology choice is largely optimal in poor countries given
their low income. In this section, I argue that an additional channel accounting for low re-
tail productivity is government policies that distort the market for cars. These policies, which
distort household decisions, have received little attention in the literature on aggregate produc-
tivity differences, which typically focus on distortions to producers.
Numerous well-known distortions can be found in the market for cars. In the developing
world, tariffs on new car imports are common, as are taxes on new car purchases regardless
of where the car is manufactured. Brazil is a particularly apt example. Because Brazil is a mem-
ber of the Mercosur regional trade union, non-member countries face a tariff of 35% to import
a car into Brazil. For any new car purchase, buyers must pay three different sales taxes, which
total from 27% to 36% of the retail price (depending on the vehicle type). In addition, anyone
operating a car in Brazil must pay an additional tax each year totaling from 1% to 6% of the ve-
hicle’s value, depending on the operator’s state of residence.18 Removing or reducing taxes of
this kind is likely to lead to substantial reductions in auto prices and increased car ownership.
One perhaps lesser-known policy that a large number of developing countries share is the re-
striction of imports of used autos. Policies of this sort typically come in the form of outright
banson used-carimports, prohibitive tariffs, andlimitations on the age ofusedvehiclesthat can
18See the Brazilian Automotive Industry (ANFAVEA) Yearbook for 2008.
22be imported. Pelletiere and Reinert (2002) document the extent of used-vehicle import restric-
tions in a large number of developed and developing countries and ﬁnd that these restrictions
are widespread and often severe. They found evidence that in 19 developing countries there
are complete prohibitions on importing a used car. In another 27 countries there are other “sub-
stantial restrictions” of various kinds.19 Restrictions on used-car imports might be an important
reason for the low rate of car ownership and low measured retail productivity in developing
countries.
6.1 Evidence from Cyprus
Because so few countries have enacted and then repealed bans on used-car imports, there is
no systematic evidence on how much repealing these bans would affect domestic car markets.
Fortunately, there is one historical episode that can shed light on the issue, occurring in Cyprus
in the 1990s.
Clerides (2008) documents that Cyprus greatly repealed its limitations on the imports of used
cars in 1993. Because this policy change occurred largely independently of other changes in the
regulatory and economic environment, Clerides argues that the Cypriot experience provides a
case study in which to learn about the effects of repealing used-car import bans. He ﬁnds that
after the restrictions were repealed, there was a substantial expansion in the overall car market
led by large increases in used-car imports (almost all from Japan). In 1992, while the bans were
still in place, just 7% of all ﬁrst-time car registrations in Cyprus were imported used cars. In
1998, after the ban was repealed, this ﬁgure skyrocketed to 72% of all ﬁrst-time registrations.
Perhaps not surprisingly, prices of the used-car imports were substantially lower than new cars
s o l do ft h es a m em a k ea n dm o d e l .
My theory predicts that this expansion in the Cypriot car market should have been accompa-
nied by an expansion in modern retailing. To help assess this prediction, I collected data on the
share of employment at modern stores and the number of large chain supermarkets in Cyprus
around the time of the car market liberalization.20 Figure 6 shows the number of used cars sold
in Cyprus overthis period (bars), the fraction of retail workers atstores with 20or more workers
(dots), and the number of supermarket stores at the largest ﬁve chains in Cyprus (solid line). A
few years after 1993 the drastic increase in sales of used cars is clearly visible. The modern-store
employment share, which unfortunately is not available in all years, rises from around 12% in
the early 1990s to around 25% by 2001. Corroborating these ofﬁcial data is the expansion of
19As of 1999, there were complete bans on used-car imports in Argentina, Algeria, Brazil, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey,
Uruguay, and Vietnam.
20The ofﬁcial Cypriot retail statistics are publicly available from the Cyprus Department of Statistics and Re-
search of the Ministry of Finance. I obtained the chain supermarket data from the stores themselves.

























































































Figure 6: Used Car Sales and Modern Store Prevalence in Cyprus
Although there are likely to have been other changes in Cyprus around this period that could
account for the rise in modern retailing, the most obvious other candidate, a dramatic rise in
income, does not seem to be supported in the data. According to the Penn World Tables, real
GDP growth was similar in the ﬁve-year period after 1993 as the ﬁve years before, with an
average growth rate of 5.4% per year before and 4.6% after. I conclude that the experience of
Cyprus is broadly consistent with my theory. This case also yields support to the idea that
repealing bans on importing used cars could be important in increasing car ownership and
retail productivity in other nations.
6.2 Model Experiment
I now use the model to gauge the potential quantitative impacts of removing distortions in the
car market on the modern retail share and labor productivity in the retail sector. I do this by
decreasing auto prices in the model by 10%, 15%, and 20%, which I consider plausible given
the evidence presented in the previous section. I ﬁnd that these impacts could be sizeable.
24CAR PRICE MODERN EMPLOYMENT CAR OWNERSHIP PRODUCTIVITY
REDUCTION SHARE RATE GAINS
0% 0.39 0.36 -
−10% 0.43 0.41 +5.5%
−15% 0.46 0.44 +7.5%
−20% 0.48 0.47 +10.4%
Table 5: Experiment: Removal of Distortions in Car Markets
The results of the experiment are presented in Table 5. The model predicts that car price drops
are associated with increases in car ownership up from 36% to 47% of all households. The as-
sociated increases in the modern employment share are up from 0.39 to 0.48, and the resulting
productivity gains are as high as 10.4%. How realistic is the model’s prediction for auto own-
ership elasticities to market prices? The model predicts an elasticity of around −1.4.M c C a r t h y
(1996) surveys estimates of the market price elasticity of demand for cars and ﬁnds a range of
−0.6 to −1.2, suggesting that the model is in the right ballpark as the available econometric ev-
idence. I conclude that distortions in the car market could be a quantitatively important factor
in explaining the limited diffusion of modern stores and low retail-sector productivity in poor
countries.
7 Conclusion
I documentthatmeasured productivity differences inretail trade between theUnitedStates and
a set of developing countries are accounted for in large part by differences in the composition
of retail technologies used. Modern stores, with high measured output per worker, are used
widely in richer countries, whereas low-productivity traditional stores are most prevalent in
the developing world.
Unlike most theories of productivity differences, whichemphasize barriers to technology adop-
tion or inefﬁcient production arrangements, retail productivity differences, in my view, largely
reﬂect optimal behavior in developing countries. Because general efﬁciency (and the wage
level) is low in developing countries, households purchase fewer cars and other household
durables that reduce shopping time. As a result, entrepreneurs rationally deploy few modern
retail stores, which are shopping-time intensive. I support the theory using new disaggregated
evidence for a set of developing countries, and with a quantitative analysis of a simple model
of home production and retail technology adoption.
25One implication of the paper is that policies which lead to inefﬁcient production in one sec-
tor of the economy might help account for low measured productivity in other sectors. This
could apply to other non-tradeable services for which frontier technologies require a large scale
of operations, and for which low household transportation costs are important. Government
investment in transportation infrastructure is one commonly mentioned way to reduce house-
hold transportation costs. I argue that another way is for governments to reduce distortions on
car ownership by households.
Finally, the paper suggests that a broader fraction of household capital and labor than previ-
ously thought are inputs to production, and hence that some household inputs are missing
from current productivity measures. In the retail trade sector, household shopping time and
capital goods used for transportation and storage, such as cars, are important components in
the widespread adoption of modern stores. More broadly, what might appear to be more ef-
ﬁcient production in developed countries may in fact be explained (in part) by households in
these countries providing more inputs into production.
A Data Appendix
Censuses of Retail Trade
As described in Section 2, the census data that I employ come from every developing country
(those with less than one-half the U. S. income per capita) in which a census of retail trade has
been conducted in the last 10 years, and for which comparable data exist. The four compati-
bility criteria are as follows. First, the data must have allowed me to isolate retail trade from
wholesale trade. Second, the census must not have excluded establishments below a certain
size. Third, the data must have reported inputs and outputs by size category of store. Fourth,
the labor input data must have included unpaid workers as well as paid, since unpaid work is
prevalent in retailing. The censuses satisfying these criteria are as follows.
Brazil — Data come from the 2002 Pesquisa Anual de Com´ ercio conducted by the Instituto
Brasileiro de Geograf´ ıa e Estat´ ıstica,
(http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/comercioeservico/pac/2005/default.shtm).
El Salvador — Data come from the 2005 Censo Econ´ omico, Com´ ercio:
(http://www.digestyc.gob.sv/).
Mexico — Data come from the 2005 Censo Econ´ omico conducted by the Instituto Nacional
de Estadist´ ıca, Geograf´ ıa e Inform´ atica (www.inegi.gob.mx/). Capital value is the reported book
value of land, structures, and equipment used for production exclusively by the establishment.
26Philippines — Data come from the 2005 Annual Survey of Philippine Business and Industry
conducted by the Philippine National Statistics Ofﬁce (http://www.census.gov.ph/)
Thailand — Data come from the 2002 Business Trade and Services Survey conducted by the
National Statistical Ofﬁce of Thailand (http://web.nso.go.th/).
United States — Data come from the BEA GDP-by-Industry Accounts. The underlying source
of the data is the Economic Census, conducted every ﬁve years by the Bureau of the Census.
For comparability with other countries, I use total full-time and part-time employees as my
measure of labor input.
Evidence that Labor Productivity Reﬂects TFP
In this section, I ask whether labor productivity differences between modern stores and tradi-
tional stores can be explained by differences in capital per worker. Using data from Mexico,
where book value of capital (including land) is collected, I ﬁnd that they are not. These ﬁndings
suggest that labor productivity measures used in this paper largely reﬂect TFP differences.
To measure TFP, I posit a Cobb-Douglas production function for the composite retail service,
speciﬁcally, Yj =m i n [ TFP j · Lγ · K1−γ,X],w h e r eK is capital equipment, structures, and land;
TFP j is total factor productivity in technology (segment) type j;a n dγ is the labor share in
technology j. The ratio of TFP in modern to traditional segments can then be written using an
expression analogous to 2.
For the labor share parameter γ, I consider a range of values, namely, 0.5, 0.6, and 0.7. The
value 0.5 corresponds to the ratio of payments to workers over value added for the modern
stores. A similar calculation for traditional stores is unlikely to be informative, however, since
such a large fraction of workers at smaller retail establishments are unpaid. Thus I consider
0.6 and 0.7 as two plausible larger values. Note that higher values of γ will tend to increase
the measured ratio of modern TFP to traditional TFP. Thus, this range should be thought of as
bounding relative TFP below.
Table 6 presents the TFP ratios I calculated for Mexico. The ﬁrst data column shows that relative
TFP is between 2.4 and 2.9 times higher in modern stores than in traditional ones, depending
on the labor share assumed. The second data column shows the relative TFP ratio as a fraction
of the relative labor productivity ratio. The fraction of the output per worker ratios accounted
for by TFP is between 65% and 77%, suggesting that output per worker largely reﬂects TFP.










Table 6: Ratio of TFP in Modern and Traditional Retailing, Mexico.
Corroborating Evidence from McKinsey Productivity Studies
In this section, I provide some corroborating evidence from the McKinsey Productivity Stud-
ies, which were conducted independently using different methods and a different set of coun-
tries. The key differences from my empirical work is that I use publicly available census data,
whereas McKinsey uses their own (smaller) samples of establishments, and I use a size-based
deﬁnition of a “modern” retail establishment, whereas they use a more descriptive deﬁnition.
Martin Baily and Robert Solow, who were both collaborators in the McKinsey studies, offer an
overview of the McKinsey ﬁndings and a more detailed description of their methods (Baily and
Solow, 2001).
In their study of cross-country differences in retailing, McKinsey obtained store-level data on
labor inputs, sales, and the cost of goods purchased for re-sale using surveys of stores designed
with the help of the economists who served as consultants. The productivity measure used in
the McKinsey studies is value added per worker, where labor input is measured as total hours
worked by paid and unpaid workers. To allow direct comparisons with the United States, pro-
ductivity measures are deﬂated using PPP exchange rates for consumption goods, or for food
when the focus is speciﬁcally on the food retail sector. McKinsey computes labor productivity
for two types of retailers: “traditional” and “modern,” which cover all establishments in the
industry. Modern stores are typically (depending on the country) made up of hypermarkets,
supermarkets, convenience stores, specialty stores, and department stores. Traditional stores
typically are deﬁned to be street vendors, open-air markets, and counter stores.
Despite our differences, the McKinsey ﬁndings paint a picture similar to mine. Table 7 dis-
plays value added per worker and employment shares for their set of developing countries
studied: Brazil, Poland, Russia, Thailand, and Turkey, as well as the United States. The table
conﬁrms each of the results put forth in the previous section. First, retail-sector productivity
28COUNTRY LABOR PRODUCTIVITY MODERN
EMPLOYMENT
RETAIL SECTOR MODERN TRADITIONAL SHARE
Brazil, Food Retail (1996) 14 51 11 7
Poland (1999) 24 83 18 8
Russia, Food Retail (1995) 23 78 22 1
Thailand (2001) 22 107 13 10
Turkey (2001) 29 72 22 12
United States (2001) 100 118 32 79
Note: VA/L in United States retail sector is normalized to 100.
Table 7: McKinsey Productivity Studies Findings for Retail in Developing Countries.
is low compared to that of the United States, at around 14% to 29% of the United States level.
Second, productivity shows up as being substantially higher in modern establishments than in
traditional ones, with a factor of 4 to 5 separating them, including the United States. Third, the
employment shares in modern stores are low in the developing countries (12% or less) and high
in the United States (79%).
B Other Theories of Retail Composition Differences
In this section, I discuss other potential reasons why developing countries have a mix of retail
establishments with relatively fewer modern stores.
One obvious candidate reason is that entry of modern stores is blocked directly through gov-
ernment policy. This is the view espoused by Parente and Prescott (1994, 1999). The McKin-
sey studies cite policies that restrict stores above a certain size threshold in Japan and argue
that the Indian government indirectly blocks large stores by prohibiting Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) in retail. Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008) conﬁrm the quantitative signiﬁcance of
the Japanese legislation and present similar evidence of regulation in France, Italy, and Korea.
Still, for many other countries, including the set studied in the current paper, laws which di-
rectly block large-scale retailers do not seem to be present. In their country reports on the retail
trade industry, for example, both Euromonitor International and McKinsey report that laws
29restricting new entry among certain retail format types are not present in Brazil, Mexico, the
Philippines, or Thailand. Nor are laws banning FDI present in retailing.
What is more common are claims that large-scale stores are affected indirectly by high tax rates
that they are too large to avoid, unlike smaller stores. According to this informality theory of
low modern store prevalence, small-scale stores can offer an artiﬁcially lower price by evading
taxes and other regulations, whereas modern stores cannot. The McKinsey studies claim that
informality is one of the main reasons modern stores are so uncommon in emerging markets.
One challenge to this theory is that if tax evasion is the main limiting factor for modern opera-
tions, then we should see large variation in modern employment shares across countries with
different tax rates. For example, Mexico has no value added tax on food, whereas Brazil has
value added taxes totaling up to 40% of the ﬁnal good price (McKinsey, 1995). As was shown
in Figure 3, however, modern stores are equally uncommon in Brazil as Mexico, which is in
variance with the tax evasion theory. Still, future exploration of this theory seems worthwhile,
given the notorious inability or unwillingness of governments in many developing countries to
deter tax evasion.
An alternative theory is that poor countries optimally choose a mix of retailers that is primar-
ily traditional because relatively lower wages in developing countries favor labor-intensive
technologies, rather than capital-intensive ones. A counterargument is that mobility of fac-
tors within a given developing country should equalize factor prices within the country. If this
is true, then one should see that modern store employment shares are similarly low in all dis-
tricts within a developing country. Yet as I documented in Section 3, there are vast differences
in modern store employment shares across districts in Mexico, and there is evidence that this
is the case in other developing nations as well. One factor for which prices do not equalize
across districts is land: land prices are higher in richer urban areas than in poorer rural ar-
eas. Yet, (land-intensive) modern stores are most prevalent in richer areas, as I show, not least
prevalent, as would be predicted by this factor-price theory.
C Model Appendix
Condition for μ to Be Increasing in E
















Zt by the production function (8). The partial derivatives of YM and YT with
respect to E can be calculated directly using the market-clearing conditions. The market for
30modern goods clears when
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∂E and represents the marginal increase in the measure of ﬂexible house-
holds shopping at modern stores. The ﬁrst and third terms are positive and represent the gain
in quantity sold at modern stores due to an E increase by modern-only and ﬂexible households.
The second termis negative and represents the decrease inquantity purchased at modernstores
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In this section, I provide a more thorough description of how the values for the model’s param-
eters are chosen. Six of the values are pinned down directly. These are E, normalized to 1, ¯ n,
set to 1/3, φη and ση to match the mean and variance of the United States household income
distribution, γ, described below, and ¯ A, set to match a $5,481 annual cost of purchasing and
operating a car. This is the American Automobile Association’s (AAA) calculation for the aver-
age cost of operating a car for one year for a total of 10,000 miles, including insurance, license,
registration, taxes, gasoline, and maintenance (see the AAA 2007 booklet Your Driving Costs,
published annually).
For γ, I choose a value of 0.66, which I set as follows. I assume that owning the car saves
shopping time in two ways. First, it reduces the travel time per shopping trip, and second, it
reduces the number of shopping trips (because the household can buy in bulk). Assuming that
31total shopping time satisﬁes
total shopping time = #o ft r i p s× (in-store time per trip + traveling time per trip),
one can back out the total time savings of owning a car by computing (1) the travel time re-
duction of a car over public transportation, (2) the reduction in number of trips with a car over
public transportation, and (3) the fraction of per tip shopping time consisting of traveling.
To compute travel time savings, I use data on commuting time, which is widely studied. Using
a large national survey ofU.S. households, the 2001National Household Travel Survey (NHTS),
the U.S. Department of Transportation computes that an average commute by private automo-
bile covered 35.2 miles per hour, whereas an average commute by public transport covered 19.6
miles per hour. This implies that public transport is 55.6% as fast as travel by car for a given
commuting trip. For the fraction of shopping time that represents travel, I compute, using the
2003 ATUS, that travel is exactly 50% of total shopping time. Finally, for trip reductions by car,
the NHTS reports that 86% as many shopping trips are taken with a car as with public trans-
portation. I assume this reﬂects the car’s advantage in economizing on the number of shopping
trips. Putting these numbers together, we see that the shopping time with a car is a fraction
0.86 × (0.5 × 1+0 .5 × 0.556) = 0.66 of shopping time without a car.
The values of the remaining seven parameters are jointly determined using seven moments
from the data. For expositional purposes, I explain the choice of each parameter along with a
target in the data which, in my opinion, most closely describes the parameter’s identiﬁcation.
I choose φψ, the ﬁrst moment of the leisure time value distribution, to match the U.S. modern
retail employment share of 0.67, as documented in Section 2.F o rσψ, I choose a value consistent
with the probability that a household shopping at a modern store comes via car (as opposed
to public transport or on foot). A study of the shopping patterns of 60,000 households in the
Quebec metropolitan area in 2001 (by Biba et al, 2006) reports that 96.7% of patrons at modern
retail establishments came via car. Using these targets, the resulting time value distribution has
parameters φψ =1 .864 and σψ =0 .290.
Next, I turn to the relative shopping costs at modern and traditional stores, νM and νT,a n dt h e
car taste parameter α. Using the 2003 ATUS, I ﬁnd that the average weekly time spent shopping
for consumer goods by households with cars and households without cars are 5.8 hours and 3.2
hours, respectively. By setting shopping times in the model to match these two averages, I pin
down νM and νT. The taste parameter for cars, α, is pinned down to give a 91% car ownership
rate, which I calculate using the 2000 Census to be the fraction of U.S. households with at least
one car. The resulting values are νM =0 .036, νT =0 .014,a n dα =0 .505.
Finally, for the production side of the economy, I pick ZT to get 14% of total employment in
the retail sector, which is the 2000 value for the United States according to the BEA. Using
32the calculations of Section 2.4,Ip i c kZM to get a relative productivity of 3 in modern stores
over traditional stores, which is a conservative value given the measurements of Section 2.T h e
parameterized values are ZT =2 .62 and ZM =7 .86.
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